Policy update : A new addition to the Fed's toolkit by Doug Campbell
O
n Dec. 12, 2007, the Federal Reserve announced a
new tool in the ongoing effort to address financial
market disruptions. Under the Term Auction Facil-
ity program, the Fed provides credit directly to banks —
where the demand for liquidity has been highest. 
The announcement was made jointly with four other 
central banks. The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England,
the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank
said they would also, in slightly different formats, pump
funds into their financial systems backed by a wide set of 
collateral.
The introduction of the auction program came amid 
serious strains in the financial markets. In announcing the
program, the Fed said it was “designed to address elevated
pressures in short-term funding markets.” Those pressures
were evident in the widened spread between two closely
watched rates — the one-month London Interbank Offered
Rate, or LIBOR, which is the rate at which major banks in
London are willing to lend Eurodollars to each other; and
the overnight indexed swap rate, or OIS, which can be inter-
preted as the average expected overnight rate over the
course of the next month. Because the OIS rate does not
tend to reflect credit and liquidity risk pressure as much as
LIBOR, the difference between the rates is useful in 
showing how much such risks are bothering markets. At its
heart, the Term Auction Facility program is about getting
funds to banks in a time when credit is tight.
Open market operations are the main tool the Fed uses 
to inject funds into financial markets. Each weekday morn-
ing, the trading desk at the New York Fed sends out an
electronic message inviting primary dealers — investment
banks that regularly trade government securities — to bid on
funds. Typically, the Fed buys securities under one-day or
two-week repurchase agreements. The awarded funds make
their way into the banking system via dealer accounts 
at clearing banks. In this fashion, the Fed raises or lowers
reserve levels at banks. If it wants to lower the target  federal
funds rate, the Fed auctions more funds, adding to reserves.
When there are more reserves, there are more funds for
banks to lend out, and so interest rates, specifically, the rates
on interbank short-term loans, should go down.
The Fed also supplies liquidity through the so-called 
discount window. Banks can go to the discount window 
at their regional Reserve Bank for short-term loans.
Historically, the discount rate is set at 1 percentage point
more than the target federal funds rate. But in August 2007,
as financial market turbulence picked up, the Federal
Reserve Board reduced the spread to half a percentage point
and in March lowered it further to a quarter point.
The two things that make the Term Auction Facility 
program different from the discount window are:
• Its anonymity, allowing banks to borrow directly from
the Fed without the perceived stigma associated with the
primary credit. Though discount window borrowings are
also anonymous, bank counterparties and other market 
participants might be able to discern that a bank has come
to the window. Identifying borrowers is much more difficult
with the Term Auction Facility program.
• The control that the trading desk wields over the size of
the auction, meaning that there is little uncertainty about
the effects on bank reserve levels. By contrast, the potential
for large, unanticipated discount window borrowings is
something that could greatly complicate the New York Fed
trading desk’s task of offsetting any significant borrowings
in open market operations.
(The Term Auction Facility program is separate from 
several other major credit and auction programs introduced
so far this year. The new Primary Dealer Credit Facility, for
example, is an overnight loan program in which borrowers
can put up a wider set of collateral than in traditional 
repurchase agreements. Acceptable collateral for the dealer
program includes investment-grade corporate securities,
municipal securities, and mortgage-backed securities.)
Strictly speaking, the Term Auction Facility program is
not a tool to conduct monetary policy. No money is added or
withdrawn from circulation, and the Fed’s balance sheet
remains the same because it liquidates holdings in propor-
tion to dollars lent through the auction. It’s much closer in
practice to discount window lending. In exchange for the
loaned funds, the Fed holds collateral from the banks. The
collateral is the same as “the wide variety of collateral that
can be used to secure loans at the discount window,” and
goes beyond the Treasury and government agency securities
required in open market operations.
The first auction was held on Dec. 17. Banks from every
Federal Reserve district submitted propositions. A total of
93 depository institutions bid about $60 billion, out of
which an aggregate $20 billion was awarded in 28-day loans.
The “stop-out” rate — the lowest accepted rate — was 4.65
percent, compared with the 4.25 percent target federal funds
rate at the time (and the 4.75 primary credit rate).
Though the lending rate is set by the market, the Fed sets
a floor. For the Dec. 17 auction, the minimum rate was 4.17.
On Feb. 25, when the target federal funds rate was 3 percent,
the minimum auction bid rate was 2.81. No maximum rate is
necessary — the final auction rate would not likely go much
above the discount window rate, since banks could go there 
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and technology.  Arkansas,
for example, today has a high
technology rice industry.
(The United States typically




The cycle of boom and bust
is older than the rice dream.
It goes to show what a tricky
proposition economic development
can be, Coclanis says.  Early settlers
made choices about what they could
grow that would bring prosperity.
“They were right in their assessment,
given the limitations of topography,
that rice was the best bet,” he says.
“But they rolled the dice on rice and
put their marbles on rice. And it did
not factor into their minds that market
conditions could change.” In the end, 
there was no internal demand to pick 
up the slack when the export market
collapsed.
Variations on this theme continue
today. Coclanis consults with Southeast
Asian countries about the development
of their economies. He sees parallels
between the fallen South Carolina rice
complex and the plight of those coun-
tries. Problems in Burma, which also
became overdependent on exports,
serve as an example. “The whole area
that became the rice exporting, produc-
tion area hardly settled till the British
came and … encouraged the Burmese 
to move from the upper to the low-
country area.” 
The Rice Niche
While the old rice empire is gone for
good, specialty rice has gained ground.
Campbell Coxe notes that in the
Western rice-growing states, “they
probably sweep up more than
we grow here.”
Still, he aims to make his
rice pay. He used to send 
his crop out to Arkansas for
milling, but has since built his
own mill, even though “every-
body thought we were crazy.”
And he’s trying to convince
other farmers that there’s a
growing gourmet market out
there for specialty rice. He
gloats a little bit when cus-
tomers in Korea and Japan order his
rice, which, by the way, they can on the
Internet at $8.47 for two pounds. And
he feels pretty good about preserving
the heirloom Carolina Gold rice for
future generations, he and the half
dozen or so others in the state who
grow it to collect the seed. Some peo-
ple  grow rice to attract waterfowl for
hunters; some just like to revisit the
history.
“We do think it’s historically bene-
ficial — if nothing else to show people
the great history behind the rice,”
Coxe says. “This one grain made South
Carolina the richest colony in the 
New World.  RF
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instead of the more expensive auction
for funds. But the discount rate does
not place a hard ceiling on the auction
rate. In fact, in the first auction in
April, the stop-out rate exceeded the
discount rate.
Early results suggested the auction
program may have been effective. The
LIBOR-OIS spread, for example, has
narrowed. When the two rates are
closer together, credit and liquidity
pressures are usually lower. However,
this spread widened again in the first
quarter of this year.
The auctions have been conducted
on a biweekly basis through February,
all were oversubscribed as bidding
institutions asked for more funds over-
all than was offered. Though the
identities of both bidding and winning
banks are not made public, the total
amount of borrowed funds going 
to each Federal Reserve district is 
reported. As of Feb. 27, for example,
banks in the Fifth District had $813
million of the $60 billion total out-
standing in the auction credit program.
The Term Auction Facility pro-
gram was introduced as a temporary 
effort. Fed officials have been largely
positive, saying it seems to have 
injected liquidity into the market
when it was needed the most. The Fed
has said it would seek public comment
before deciding whether to make the
program permanent. RF
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